SERVICES
  Consultancy
  Conferencing Facility
  Conservation Activities
  Advertisements
  Safety & Environment
  Training & Events 
  Market Survey
  Logistics
  Maps of India
  YELLOW PAGES
  Importers
  Exporters
  Retail Buyers
  Retail Sellers
  Useful Links
  SECTOR OVERVIEW
  Refineries
  Marketing
  Product Availability
  Economic Data
  World Oil Statistics
  Railway Key Data
  Lube Production
  Conversions
   
   
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Russian impact on western oil policy

 

At present, Russia enjoys a controlling interest over export routes for Central Asian energy. The Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) route, for example, connects oil fields in western Kazakhstan with the Russian port of Novorossiysk. Gas from Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan is similarly funneled through Russia.

 

One or more pipelines stretching along the Caspian’s seabed would effectively break a Russian monopoly over export routes between Central Asia’s key energy producers – Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan – and Western markets.

 

After realization of Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline and South Caucasus Pipeline (Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum pipeline) projects, Russia became very anxious. The monopoly status of Russia in the fields of oil and gas can come to an end. Moreover, the realization of Trans-Caspian Pipeline project can also harm to the Russian monopoly in the region. 

 

The aim of this pipeline is to transport Kazakh and Turkmen natural gas through Turkey to Europe. Baku estimates the construction costs at $5 billion for a pipeline with an annual capacity of 30 billion cubic meters that would run from the eastern Caspian shore, across the seabed to Azerbaijan, and further via Georgia into Turkey. With Turkey as a transit corridor, the gas could be piped to European Union member countries in southern and central Europe.

 

The South Caucasus Pipeline constitutes the first leg of the Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline (TCGP) project, integrating the Trans-Caspian gas pipeline with the Nabucco project (Turkey-Bulgaria-Romania-Hungary-Austria) by connecting the two planned lines near Erzurum. 

 

The project of natural gas import from Turkmenistan through the submarine pipeline was suggested in 1996 by the United States. In 1999, the OSCE meeting in Istanbul issued a declaration of intent to construct a pipeline. However, because of complicated relations between Caspian Sea countries (particularly as a result of Russia’s and Iran’s opposition to the project), the unresolved legal dispute of the Caspian Sea boundaries and the gas discovery on Azerbaijan’s Shah Deniz field, the submarine pipeline project was shelved since summer of 2000 and only the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum pipeline project was developed parallel to the Baku-Tbilisi- Ceyhan oil pipeline that recently entered service. Since January 2006, the TCGP project has been reactivated, probably also because of Russian gas disputes with some of its neighbours.

 

A precondition for any international financing of any new TCGP project is resolution of the territorial dispute between Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan over the mid-south Caspian field that is called Kapaz. Although Azerbaijan’s case for sole sovereignty over Kapaz is well founded under international law, Azerbaijani side offered in 1997 the possibility of joint development of the field to Turkmenistan, which nevertheless rejected it.

 

Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Russia have implemented a "modified median line" principle, well established in international law, to the demarcation of sovereignty over resources under the bed of the Caspian Sea.

 

This offers a precedent for the resolution of the territorial conflict between Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan over the Kapaz field, which lies in the middle of the southern Caspian Sea, divided by a median line between the Azerbaijani and Turkmenistan coasts if such a line were to be drawn.

 

For this, it would not be necessary to resolve boundary questions between Azerbaijan and Iran, between Turkmenistan and Iran, or even between Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan. It would only require Turkmenistan to agree on such a "modified median line" principle to demarcate its boundary with Azerbaijan over use of undersea resources.

 

The Trans-Caspian project is heavily criticized by Russia and Iran, current export countries of Turkmen gas. Russian officials have stated that a major gas pipeline would pose a serious, dangerous risk to the prosperity of the entire region.

 

Russia has also staked out a position that a potential pipeline project, regardless of the route it takes on the seabed, would require the consent of all five Caspian littoral states in order to proceed. Iran has pointed out that treaties signed by Iran and the Soviet Union in 1921 and 1940 are still in force and that any action taken without the consent of all the littoral states will be considered illegal.

 

Azerbaijan, which stands to gain the most from undersea pipelines, has challenged Russia’s assertions concerning the ecological danger. "The Russian side has submitted arguments, but Azerbaijani experts have provided demonstrations," said Azerbaijani Deputy Foreign Minister Khalaf Khalafov. At the same time, he refrained from rejecting the Russian pipeline stance outright. Kazakhstani officials have also questioned the validity of Russia’s environmental claims. 

 

Azerbaijan’s Industry and Energy Minister Natig Aliyev emphasized that "Trans-Caspian seabed pipeline would ensure Europe’s energy security and protect it from Russian monopolism" and "Europe has understood that it is naive to place all its hopes on Russian gas.

 

The events of recent months, when Russia has in effect demonstrated its status as a monopolist, indicate that prices will rise further" he added. On the other hand, Russia does not intend to reconcile with the current situation, that’s why Russia signed an intergovernmental agreement with Bulgaria and Greece to build the Trans-Balkan Oil Pipeline, Burgas-Alexandropolis.

 

The pipeline, the first-ever to be controlled by the Russian state on European Union territory, would carry oil mainly from Russian Black Sea ports to the Aegean for shipment from there by tankers.

 

However, the Burgas-Alexandropolis project runs counter to the EU’s strategic interest of reducing dependence on Russia-delivered energy. If built, this pipeline will become, in effect, a prolongation of the Caspian Pipeline Consortium’s (CPC) line from Kazakhstan to Russia’s Black Sea port of Novorossiysk, in direct rivalry to Trans-Caspian oil transport projects from Kazakhstan westward, such as the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline.

 

The Burgas-Alexandropolis line would also divert Caspian oil volumes necessary to the Odessa-Brody pipeline in Ukraine and its possible extension into Poland.

 

Moreover, Gazprom has proposed an alternative project competing Nabucco Pipeline by constructing a second section of the Blue Stream pipeline beneath the Black Sea to Turkey, and extending this up through Bulgaria, Serbia and Croatia to western Hungary.

 

Europe may still face gas control by Russia

Specialists from the International Energy Agency and Oxford University Monday told a Washington forum that despite European Union efforts to diversify sources, Russia’s Gazprom is likely to retain its dominant position in supplying gas to Western Europe. VOA’s Barry Wood reports.Nicholas Van Agt from the Paris-based IEA says Gazprom is opposed to a European Union backed plan to build a gas pipeline across the Caspian Sea that would bring Turkman and Kazakh gas to Turkey and Western Europe. 

 

He says Gazprom would prefer to see Europe’s continued reliance on Soviet-era pipelines that feed Central Asian gas into the Russian distribution system. Van Agt says that Gazprom is implementing this strategy by having already made long-term purchases of Turkmen gas. Both Central Asian republics have huge gas reserves and want to boost their exports to Europe.

 

Gazprom is by far the biggest foreign supplier of gas to Western Europe. Worried that it could become excessively reliant on a single supplier, the European Union is actively promoting the Nabucco pipeline that would run from eastern Turkey to Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary and Austria. This line could supply gas from various sources including Russia, Central Asia, and Iran.

 

Jennifer Coolidge, an energy specialist at Oxford University, says it is not only Europe but also China and India that seek to tap Caspian basin gas. She is not optimistic that a much-discussed pipeline from Iran across Pakistan to India will soon be built. If it is built, Coolidge says it will likely not be extended from India eastward to China. "It still remains to be seen, despite the (recent) agreement on price (of the gas) whether this (pipeline) actually will go forward. I think it would be wholly less likely that it will ever go forward and go on to China," she said.

 

Both experts say that Gazprom’s objectives are fully compatible with Russian foreign policy, which aims at maximizing Russia’s position as a leading exporter of oil and gas. Van Agt says Gazprom is sponsoring a new pipeline from Russia across the Baltic Sea to Germany to gain direct access to an important market. "I think obviously Gazprom is increasing its options to reach its preferred premium market in Europe without potential interference by transit states," he said.

 

Currently most Russian gas transits Poland on its way to Western Europe. While Western European gas demand is rising, following the brief 2006 Russian cut off of gas to Ukraine, the EU is seeking alternative supplies. Russia, say the researchers, is making that quest for diversification more difficult in Central Asia.

 

Russia-led Gas Cartel’’

 

Russia, Iran, Qatar, Venezuela, and other members of the Gas Exporting Countries Forum (G.E.C.F.) met in Doha on April 9 amidst Western fears that Moscow may encourage the birth of a "gas O.P.E.C." Western decision-makers fear that such a new organization could give producers of natural gas an advantage over consumers.

 

Russia (the world’s leading producer and exporter of natural gas) as well as Iran and Qatar (the two Middle Eastern powers with the largest gas reserves) have repeatedly denied that a gas cartel is under construction. Moreover, energy analysts agree that the natural gas market is still very different from that of oil, and that a "gas O.P.E.C." would not be easy to establish.

 

According to the argument, natural gas does not have a global market like oil. For the most part, gas is not traded on the open market (unlike oil), and the majority of contracts between producers and buyers are long-term deals. Hence, gas pricing functions differently than oil pricing.

 

In addition, natural gas transportation is more dependent on pipelines than is oil, since the former needs to be liquefied (and subsequently re-gasified) if transported by ship. Consequently, the regional geography that links producers-exporters and buyers still prevails over a more global network of transport routes. For instance, Russia (the exporter) and the European Union (the importer) are tightly linked by the fact that an extended network of gas pipelines exist between the Russian Federation and Eastern, Central and Western Europe.

 

Nevertheless, the idea of a gas cartel resembling O.P.E.C. cannot be dismissed. Russian, Iranian, and Qatari denials of such plans can be interpreted as a series of declarations aimed at easing U.S. and European concerns over the eventual creation of a "gas O.P.E.C." As usual in political and strategic issues, actions are far more important than words. In spite of such denials, Russia, Iran, Qatar, Venezuela and the other G.E.C.F. members are evaluating the pros and cons of setting up the gas cartel.

 

Not all powers that host huge quantities of natural gas are major gas exporters. Iran and Venezuela, for instance, lack the investment and technology to exploit their natural gas resources fully. Russia is by far the world giant in natural gas production and exports, as it holds 47.8 billion cubic meters of gas reserves (the largest amount globally) and controls 21.6 percent of the world’s natural gas exports. On the contrary, Iran, despite its 26.7 billion cubic meters of gas reserves, only counts for 3.1 percent of world exports. 

 

Since Russia’s energy giant Gazprom is rapidly becoming Europe’s dominant natural gas operator, Moscow is interested in augmenting its political and economic influence on those countries that may provide Europe with an alternative. As such, Gazprom quickly moved to secure alliances with Algeria’s national champion Sonatrach (in 2006) and with Turkmenistan’s national energy sector (in 2006, before President Saparmurat Niyazov’s death), and Moscow is now eying Qatar, Iran, and Venezuela as potential partners for a newly structured gas suppliers organization.

 

The events of the last few years, which saw Russia consolidating and securing control over its huge gas reserves before moving aggressively toward market domination in Europe and parts of Asia, suggest that Moscow is willing to co-opt its main Eurasian competitors in a sort of "soft monopoly." 

 

Algeria’s energy minister, Chakib Khelil, said after the Doha meeting that "in the long term, we are moving toward a gas O.P.E.C.," while the U.A.E.’s energy minister, Mohamed Bin Dhaen al-Hamli, declared that "the time of cheap gas is a matter of the past."Moscow still denies that it wants to build a gas cartel resembling O.P.E.C. It is far from clear, also, if Qatar and the U.A.E. would join an organization that would be strongly opposed by the United States and its allies, at a time when instability in the Middle East makes Washington a needed security supplier for the small energy-rich Gulf monarchies. As a consequence, the birth of a gas O.P.E.C. is not certain. 

 

Regardless, its potential effects upon European energy security are already visible. Europe is still lacking a common energy strategy, and its enhancement — which is one of the German E.U. presidency’s priorities — is still too slow to be effective. The result is that Russia could succeed in co-opting its main competitors in natural gas markets before Europe is able to actually implement a strong diversification strategy.

 

The bottom line is that European powers are rethinking their nuclear power policies. Civil nuclear power has many new supporters in Europe, but the memory of the disastrous Chernobyl incident (1986) and the problems linked to nuclear power’s dual use (especially at a time of proliferation) makes it difficult to propose a robust investment policy in new nuclear policies in many European countries.Poland, Lithuania and Estonia, however, announced last week that they are going to jointly upgrade a Lithuanian power plant, as they clearly stated the urgency to ease their energy dependence on Moscow.

 

Russia may not give birth to a gas O.P.E.C., but it will probably be able to coordinate natural gas supply policies to a certain extent. Brussels will find it hard to implement its needed diversification strategy in an effective way. At the same time, research in solar- or hydrogen-based energy is years away from producing industrially and commercially viable alternatives.Therefore, strong political trends directly linked to energy security will likely make the revival of nuclear power in Europe unstoppable. 

 

 

 

Copyright © 2000 - 2001 PetroleumBazaar. All Rights Reserved - Disclaimer