At
present, Russia enjoys a controlling interest over export
routes for Central Asian energy. The Caspian Pipeline Cons
ortium
(CPC) route, for example, connects oil fields in western
Kazakhstan with the Russian port of Novorossiysk. Gas from
Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan is similarly
funneled through Russia.
One
or more pipelines stretching along the Caspian’s seabed
would effectively break a Russian monopoly over export
routes between Central Asia’s key energy producers –
Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan – and Western markets.
After
realization of Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline and
South Caucasus Pipeline (Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum pipeline)
projects, Russia became very anxious. The monopoly status of
Russia in the fields of oil and gas can come to an end.
Moreover, the realization of Trans-Caspian Pipeline project
can also harm to the Russian monopoly in the region.
The
aim of this pipeline is to transport Kazakh and Turkmen
natural gas through Turkey to Europe. Baku estimates the
construction costs at $5 billion for a pipeline with an
annual capacity of 30 billion cubic meters that would run
from the eastern Caspian shore, across the seabed to
Azerbaijan, and further via Georgia into Turkey. With Turkey
as a transit corridor, the gas could be piped to European
Union member countries in southern and central Europe.
The
South Caucasus Pipeline constitutes the first leg of the
Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline (TCGP) project, integrating the
Trans-Caspian gas pipeline with the Nabucco project
(Turkey-Bulgaria-Romania-Hungary-Austria) by connecting the
two planned lines near Erzurum.
The
project of natural gas import from Turkmenistan through the
submarine pipeline was suggested in 1996 by the United
States. In 1999, the OSCE meeting in Istanbul issued a
declaration of intent to construct a pipeline. However,
because of complicated relations between Caspian Sea
countries (particularly as a result of Russia’s and Iran’s
opposition to the project), the unresolved legal dispute of
the Caspian Sea boundaries and the gas discovery on
Azerbaijan’s Shah Deniz field, the submarine pipeline
project was shelved since summer of 2000 and only the
Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum pipeline project was developed parallel
to the Baku-Tbilisi- Ceyhan oil pipeline that recently
entered service. Since January 2006, the TCGP project has
been reactivated, probably also because of Russian gas
disputes with some of its neighbours.
A
precondition for any international financing of any new TCGP
project is resolution of the territorial dispute between
Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan over the mid-south Caspian field
that is called Kapaz. Although Azerbaijan’s case for sole
sovereignty over Kapaz is well founded under international
law, Azerbaijani side offered in 1997 the possibility of
joint development of the field to Turkmenistan, which
nevertheless rejected it.
Azerbaijan,
Kazakhstan and Russia have implemented a "modified
median line" principle, well established in
international law, to the demarcation of sovereignty over
resources under the bed of the Caspian Sea.
This
offers a precedent for the resolution of the territorial
conflict between Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan over the Kapaz
field, which lies in the middle of the southern Caspian Sea,
divided by a median line between the Azerbaijani and
Turkmenistan coasts if such a line were to be drawn.
For
this, it would not be necessary to resolve boundary
questions between Azerbaijan and Iran, between Turkmenistan
and Iran, or even between Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan. It
would only require Turkmenistan to agree on such a
"modified median line" principle to demarcate its
boundary with Azerbaijan over use of undersea resources.
The
Trans-Caspian project is heavily criticized by Russia and
Iran, current export countries of Turkmen gas. Russian
officials have stated that a major gas pipeline would pose a
serious, dangerous risk to the prosperity of the entire
region.
Russia
has also staked out a position that a potential pipeline
project, regardless of the route it takes on the seabed,
would require the consent of all five Caspian littoral
states in order to proceed. Iran has pointed out that
treaties signed by Iran and the Soviet Union in 1921 and
1940 are still in force and that any action taken without
the consent of all the littoral states will be considered
illegal.
Azerbaijan,
which stands to gain the most from undersea pipelines, has
challenged Russia’s assertions concerning the ecological
danger. "The Russian side has submitted arguments, but
Azerbaijani experts have provided demonstrations," said
Azerbaijani Deputy Foreign Minister Khalaf Khalafov. At the
same time, he refrained from rejecting the Russian pipeline
stance outright. Kazakhstani officials have also questioned
the validity of Russia’s environmental claims.
Azerbaijan’s
Industry and Energy Minister Natig Aliyev emphasized that
"Trans-Caspian seabed pipeline would ensure Europe’s
energy security and protect it from Russian monopolism"
and "Europe has understood that it is naive to place
all its hopes on Russian gas.
The
events of recent months, when Russia has in effect
demonstrated its status as a monopolist, indicate that
prices will rise further" he added. On the other
hand, Russia does not intend to reconcile with the current
situation, that’s why Russia signed an intergovernmental
agreement with Bulgaria and Greece to build the Trans-Balkan
Oil Pipeline, Burgas-Alexandropolis.
The
pipeline, the first-ever to be controlled by the Russian
state on European Union territory, would carry oil mainly
from Russian Black Sea ports to the Aegean for shipment from
there by tankers.
However,
the Burgas-Alexandropolis project runs counter to the EU’s
strategic interest of reducing dependence on
Russia-delivered energy. If built, this pipeline will
become, in effect, a prolongation of the Caspian Pipeline
Consortium’s (CPC) line from Kazakhstan to Russia’s
Black Sea port of Novorossiysk, in direct rivalry to
Trans-Caspian oil transport projects from Kazakhstan
westward, such as the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline.
The
Burgas-Alexandropolis line would also divert Caspian oil
volumes necessary to the Odessa-Brody pipeline in Ukraine
and its possible extension into Poland.
Moreover,
Gazprom has proposed an alternative project competing
Nabucco Pipeline by constructing a second section of the
Blue Stream pipeline beneath the Black Sea to Turkey, and
extending this up through Bulgaria, Serbia and Croatia to
western Hungary.
Europe
may still face gas control by Russia
Specialists
from the International Energy Agency and Oxford University
Monday told a Washington forum that despite European Union
efforts to diversify sources, Russia’s Gazprom is likely
to retain its dominant position in supplying gas to Western
Europe. VOA’s Barry Wood reports.Nicholas Van Agt from the
Paris-based IEA says Gazprom is opposed to a European Union
backed plan to build a gas pipeline across the Caspian Sea
that would bring Turkman and Kazakh gas to Turkey and
Western Europe.
He
says Gazprom would prefer to see Europe’s continued
reliance on Soviet-era pipelines that feed Central Asian gas
into the Russian distribution system. Van Agt says that
Gazprom is implementing this strategy by having already made
long-term purchases of Turkmen gas. Both Central Asian
republics have huge gas reserves and want to boost their
exports to Europe.
Gazprom
is by far the biggest foreign supplier of gas to Western
Europe. Worried that it could become excessively reliant on
a single supplier, the European Union is actively promoting
the Nabucco pipeline that would run from eastern Turkey to
Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary and Austria. This line could
supply gas from various sources including Russia, Central
Asia, and Iran.
Jennifer
Coolidge, an energy specialist at Oxford University, says it
is not only Europe but also China and India that seek to tap
Caspian basin gas. She is not optimistic that a
much-discussed pipeline from Iran across Pakistan to India
will soon be built. If it is built, Coolidge says it will
likely not be extended from India eastward to China.
"It still remains to be seen, despite the (recent)
agreement on price (of the gas) whether this (pipeline)
actually will go forward. I think it would be wholly less
likely that it will ever go forward and go on to
China," she said.
Both
experts say that Gazprom’s objectives are fully compatible
with Russian foreign policy, which aims at maximizing Russia’s
position as a leading exporter of oil and gas. Van Agt says
Gazprom is sponsoring a new pipeline from Russia across the
Baltic Sea to Germany to gain direct access to an important
market. "I think obviously Gazprom is increasing its
options to reach its preferred premium market in Europe
without potential interference by transit states," he
said.
Currently
most Russian gas transits Poland on its way to Western
Europe. While Western European gas demand is rising,
following the brief 2006 Russian cut off of gas to Ukraine,
the EU is seeking alternative supplies. Russia, say the
researchers, is making that quest for diversification more
difficult in Central Asia.
Russia-led
Gas Cartel’’
Russia,
Iran, Qatar, Venezuela, and other members of the Gas
Exporting Countries Forum (G.E.C.F.) met in Doha on April 9
amidst Western fears that Moscow may encourage the birth of
a "gas O.P.E.C." Western decision-makers fear that
such a new organization could give producers of natural gas
an advantage over consumers.
Russia
(the world’s leading producer and exporter of natural gas)
as well as Iran and Qatar (the two Middle Eastern powers
with the largest gas reserves) have repeatedly denied that a
gas cartel is under construction. Moreover, energy analysts
agree that the natural gas market is still very different
from that of oil, and that a "gas O.P.E.C." would
not be easy to establish.
According
to the argument, natural gas does not have a global market
like oil. For the most part, gas is not traded on the open
market (unlike oil), and the majority of contracts between
producers and buyers are long-term deals. Hence, gas pricing
functions differently than oil pricing.
In
addition, natural gas transportation is more dependent on
pipelines than is oil, since the former needs to be
liquefied (and subsequently re-gasified) if transported by
ship. Consequently, the regional geography that links
producers-exporters and buyers still prevails over a more
global network of transport routes. For instance, Russia
(the exporter) and the European Union (the importer) are
tightly linked by the fact that an extended network of gas
pipelines exist between the Russian Federation and Eastern,
Central and Western Europe.
Nevertheless,
the idea of a gas cartel resembling O.P.E.C. cannot be
dismissed. Russian, Iranian, and Qatari denials of such
plans can be interpreted as a series of declarations aimed
at easing U.S. and European concerns over the eventual
creation of a "gas O.P.E.C." As usual in political
and strategic issues, actions are far more important than
words. In spite of such denials, Russia, Iran, Qatar,
Venezuela and the other G.E.C.F. members are evaluating the
pros and cons of setting up the gas cartel.
Not
all powers that host huge quantities of natural gas are
major gas exporters. Iran and Venezuela, for instance, lack
the investment and technology to exploit their natural gas
resources fully. Russia is by far the world giant in natural
gas production and exports, as it holds 47.8 billion cubic
meters of gas reserves (the largest amount globally) and
controls 21.6 percent of the world’s natural gas exports.
On the contrary, Iran, despite its 26.7 billion cubic meters
of gas reserves, only counts for 3.1 percent of world
exports.
Since
Russia’s energy giant Gazprom is rapidly becoming Europe’s
dominant natural gas operator, Moscow is interested in
augmenting its political and economic influence on those
countries that may provide Europe with an alternative. As
such, Gazprom quickly moved to secure alliances with Algeria’s
national champion Sonatrach (in 2006) and with Turkmenistan’s
national energy sector (in 2006, before President Saparmurat
Niyazov’s death), and Moscow is now eying Qatar, Iran, and
Venezuela as potential partners for a newly structured gas
suppliers organization.
The
events of the last few years, which saw Russia consolidating
and securing control over its huge gas reserves before
moving aggressively toward market domination in Europe and
parts of Asia, suggest that Moscow is willing to co-opt its
main Eurasian competitors in a sort of "soft
monopoly."
Algeria’s
energy minister, Chakib Khelil, said after the Doha meeting
that "in the long term, we are moving toward a gas
O.P.E.C.," while the U.A.E.’s energy minister,
Mohamed Bin Dhaen al-Hamli, declared that "the time of
cheap gas is a matter of the past."Moscow still denies
that it wants to build a gas cartel resembling O.P.E.C. It
is far from clear, also, if Qatar and the U.A.E. would join
an organization that would be strongly opposed by the United
States and its allies, at a time when instability in the
Middle East makes Washington a needed security supplier for
the small energy-rich Gulf monarchies. As a consequence, the
birth of a gas O.P.E.C. is not certain.
Regardless,
its potential effects upon European energy security are
already visible. Europe is still lacking a common energy
strategy, and its enhancement — which is one of the German
E.U. presidency’s priorities — is still too slow to be
effective. The result is that Russia could succeed in
co-opting its main competitors in natural gas markets before
Europe is able to actually implement a strong
diversification strategy.
The
bottom line is that European powers are rethinking their
nuclear power policies. Civil nuclear power has many new
supporters in Europe, but the memory of the disastrous
Chernobyl incident (1986) and the problems linked to nuclear
power’s dual use (especially at a time of proliferation)
makes it difficult to propose a robust investment policy in
new nuclear policies in many European countries.Poland,
Lithuania and Estonia, however, announced last week that
they are going to jointly upgrade a Lithuanian power plant,
as they clearly stated the urgency to ease their energy
dependence on Moscow.
Russia
may not give birth to a gas O.P.E.C., but it will probably
be able to coordinate natural gas supply policies to a
certain extent. Brussels will find it hard to implement its
needed diversification strategy in an effective way. At the
same time, research in solar- or hydrogen-based energy is
years away from producing industrially and commercially
viable alternatives.Therefore, strong political trends
directly linked to energy security will likely make the
revival of nuclear power in Europe unstoppable.